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The Two Justices Harlan on Civil
Rights and Liberties: A Study in
Judicial Contrasts
By LEWIS I. MADDOCKS*
INTRODUCTION
John Marshall Harlan was a justice of the United States
Supreme Court from 1877 to 1911, and his grandson, also
named John Marshall Harlan, served on the Court from 1955
to 1971. Referred to here as Justice Harlan I and Justice
Harlan II, respectively, the contrast in their judicial philoso-
phies will be demonstrated through an analysis of their opin-
ions in representative cases concerning questions of civil rights
and liberties. In this area the contrast in the two Justice
Harlans is seen not so much in the views which they expressed
on minority rights or the importance of substantive and proce-
dural due process, but rather in the differences in their atti-
tudes toward the role of the Court in guaranteeing these
rights.
In the representative cases discussed below, Justice
Harlan I emerges as a devout nationalist-one who considered
the protection of individual rights to be the responsibility of
the national government.' Although on occasion he railed
against judicial legislation,' he emerges, on the whole, as a ju-
dicial activist calling upon the Court to exercise its power and
responsibility to override state legislation which had weakened
the civil rights of black citizens by imposing upon them the
badges of servitude.3 He was quick to oppose the increasing
influx of Jim Crow legislation which became prevalent
* Associate Professor of American Government and Constitutional Law,
Marywood College. A.B. 1943, Marshall University; M.A. 1948, Boston University;
Ph.D. 1959, Ohio State University.
I G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JuDicIAL TRADITION 135-36 (1976).
2 Harlan was generally an opponent of judicial legislation when Congress had en-
acted national legislation on the same issue. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the
Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J.
637, 695-96 (1957).
3 Id. at 696.
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throughout the South during his years on the Court.4 Further-
more, he interpreted the Civil War Amendments very broadly5
to require total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, thus mak-
ing all its provisions applicable to state laws and criminal
procedures.'
A study of Justice Harlan I's opinions does not reveal a
well-defined judicial philosophy regarding the role of the
Court, the balance of federalism and nationalism, or the issue
of broad as opposed to strict constructionism. Rather, one
finds that Harlan was deeply committed to individual rights,
which he felt must be protected by the Court regardless of
whether such protection was nationalist or federalist, deter-
mined by judicial activism or judicial self-restraint, or derived
from broad or strict constructionism. He was convinced that
the opposing philosophies of judicial self-restraint and judicial
activism were not doctrines to which decisions should bendJ
but simply were instruments to be used to argue for a just re-
sult,8 whether that result was the protection of a civil right or
liberty, or the protection of private property. Therefore, at
times Harlan I condemned the Court for engaging in judicial
legislation in violation of the principle of judicial self-re-
straint,9 while at other junctures he condemned the Court ma-
jority for failing to act positively and forthrightly in executing
its responsibility of judicial activism.'0
Although scholars who label Justice Harlan I as a nation-
alist, a judicial activist and a broad constructionist can find
considerable support in his opinions," it must be remembered
that often Harlan deviated from such easy labelling, because
Id. at 705-09.
G. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 133.
Id. at 143-44.
"In this respect, Harlan stood in the classic pattern of those who espouse judi-
cial self-restraint on behalf of majority rule but are so devoted to civil liberty that
they cannot always restrain themselves." Westin, supra note 2, at 697.
"If a solid legal ground was available to support a 'just' result, Harlan would
urge it with vigor. If not, it was a rare 'outrage' case in which Harlan would not urge a
less-than-solid ground with all the vigor that his moral indignation unfailingly sup-
plied." Id. at 696-97.
' Abraham, John Marshall Harlan: The Justice and the Man, 46 Ky. L.J. 448,
450 (1958).
,o Westin, supra note 2, at 696-97.
" See, e.g., G. WHITE, supra note 1, at 131.
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he was consistently result-oriented. 2 His goal was not the
preservation of a consistent judicial or constitutional philoso-
phy, but rather the preservation of the economic, social, civil
and political rights of the individual. 3 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in his opinions in cases involving civil rights
and liberties.
In contrast, an analysis of the opinions of Justice Harlan
II demonstrates that he was much concerned with judicial
self-restraint and the preservation of federalism against in-
creasing centralization of power in the national government.'4
His opinions on civil liberties reveal a fear that incorporation
of the Bill of Rights was a denial of the rights of the states to
fashion a system of due process that was guided by an element
of fairness and a fundamental "scheme of ordered liberty." He
objected to tying the states to the rigid conformity of the spe-
cific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 5 As shall be examined, he
rejected selective incorporation more vehemently than he did
the total incorporation views of his grandfather. As he ex-
plained in a concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas," "The
philosophy of 'incorporation,'". . . subordinates all such state
differences to the particular requirements of the federal Bill of
Rights . . .and increasingly subjects state legal processes to
enveloping federal judicial authority."'7 In his opposition to
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights emerges Harlan's at-
tempt not only to provide greater flexibility for the states in
determining the meaning of due process, but also to encourage
the recognition of rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
but nevertheless worthy of protection. 8
Justice Harlan II contrasts with his grandfather in his
carefully reasoned and disinterested intellectual approach to
" "Ultimately, his jurisprudence resists categorization, except as result-orienta-
tion. .. ." Id. at 144-45.
" Id. at 131.
" THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 1-2 (D. Shapiro ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as EVOLUTION].
15 Id.
" 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 409.
28 For example, Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) is
ahead of the Court on this point-a position which the Court did not adopt until 1965
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1979-801
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cases without regard to whether a particular result reflected
good public policy. Examination of Harlan H's opinions
reveals that his devotion to constitutional principles rather
than to obtaining the right result led to a judicial detachment
and neutrality regarding the "cause" which a case involved.' 9
He viewed the Constitution as the articulation of rights and
powers which must be preserved and believed that the Court's
role was to guarantee that the principles of federalism, separa-
tion of powers and representative democracy were maintained.
In his foreword to a recent book about Harlan 11,20 Professor
Paul Freund described Harlan's approach:
The positions he takes on constitutional issues, stressing
continuity and tradition more strongly than is fashionable
with many students, do not cloud their appreciation of the
opinions themselves. Indeed, the very students who more
often than not regret the Justice's position freely acknowl-
edge that when he has written a concurring or dissenting
opinion they turn to it first, for a full and candid exposition
of the case and an intellectually rewarding analysis of the
issues.2'
Harlan H's condemnation of the Court's support of "one-
man, one-vote" in the legislative reapportionment cases 2  illus-
trates Professor Freund's appraisal of Harlan's judicial philos-
ophy. Harlan opposed the Court's application of the equal
protection clause 3 to strike down residence requirements for
welfare recipients, as well as its use to declare invalid a state
poll tax;25 whether the poll tax for voting was good or bad pol-
icy was irrelevant to Harlan H. In his devotion to judicial self-
,9 G. WHrr, supra note 1, at 345.
21 Freund, Foreword to THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY xiii (D. Shapiro
ed. 1969).
22 Id. at xiv.
12 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Here, Harlan argued in dissent that a state might reasonably require voters to pay a
nominal tax to vote in order to assure that only those who cared enough to vote would
pay the fee to do so.
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restraint and the precepts of federalism, he exhibited a
profound trust and respect for representative democracy, as
well as a deep suspicion toward a judicial elite solving
problems which he felt were better left to the political
branches of the government.
I. JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN I
A well-known fact about Justice Harlan I was his opposi-
tion to laws which discriminated against the newly freed
blacks. 6 This attitude is particularly interesting in light of his
support of slavery during as well as prior to the Civil War.Y In
his campaign for Congress in 1859, as the Whig Party's candi-
date, he strove to surpass the Democrats in championing slav-
ery. 8 He opposed the "tyranny of majority rule" which would
take from the slaveholder what had traditionally been re-
garded as his property-just as in later years he deplored the
tyranny of the majority which would deprive the newly freed
slaves of their rights.29
Even during the Civil War, as an officer in the Union
Army, he recruited men for the 10th Kentucky Volunteer In-
fantry, promising that "'if he saw any decision on the part of
the Government to turn the war into a struggle for the de-
struction of slavery he would not only resign his commission
but he would go over to the Confederates and take his regi-
ment with him, and help them to fight their battles against
the Government.' "3a Even in 1865 he expressed his opposition
to the thirteenth amendment as "a flagrant invasion of the
right of self-government and the state should show that it was
still master in its own household."'"
Harlan I challenged the Emancipation Proclamation as
being unconstitutional, 32 a conservative position which he con-
tinued a year later when he supported the candidacy of Mc-
" See Westin, supra note 2, at 705-09.
2 Id. at 638-52. In fact, Harlan came from a slave-owning family.
'- Id. at 643.
2, Id. at 705-09.
m Frankfort Tri-Weekly Yeoman, July 21, 1866, reprinted in Hartz, John M.
Harlan in Kentucky, 1855-77, 14 THE FLsON CLuB HIST. Q. 17, 25 (1940).
31 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, July 7, 1865.
32 G. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 131.
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Clellan rather than that of Lincoln for President.3 3 In 1865,
when he was asked by Colonel John Combs to run for Con-
gress as the Conservative Union candidate, Harlan refused. In
his letter to Combs, he stated his belief that the thirteenth
amendment would "destroy the peace and security of the
white man in Kentucky," and he pleaded for a "thorough
union of all citizens who . . . are opposed to the admission of
the Negro to the ballot-box or to the enjoyment of political
privileges. '3
Although later Harlan radically changed his opinion re-
garding the rights of blacks, in his arguments at this time can
be seen his opposition to a principle he would never ac-
cept-unlimited majority rule. In his letter to Colonel Combs,
Harlan wrote that the amendment was "a direct interference,
by a portion of the States with local concerns of other States,
and . . . at war with the genius and spirit of our republican
institutions. . . . If three-fourths of the States and two-thirds
of each branch of Congress can . . . abolish slavery in Ken-
tucky, the same power can establish slavery in Ohio." 5
Quite naturally, during Harlan I's campaign for Governor
of Kentucky in 1871, the opposition took advantage of his past
statements and confronted him with them at every opportu-
nity. On one occasion when his opponent, Governor Leslie,
pointed out how Harlan had changed in his views on the thir-
teenth amendment, Harlan replied:
I have acquiesed in the irreversible results of the recent war;
I recognize my errors in some respects. It can be said of no
man that he has changed no opinion within the last ten
years in the pressure of the stirring events of that period. Let
it rather be said of me that I am right rather than
consistent."
There is herein an indication of the result-oriented approach
by Harlan toward the issues he faced. A consideration of his
views on the subject of civil rights while a Supreme Court Jus-
Abraham, supra note 9, at 453.
" 15 Lexington Observer & Reporter, June 1, 1865, reprinted in Hartz, John A.
Harlan in Kentucky, 1855-77, 14 THM FISON CLUB HisT. Q. 17, 29 (1940).
1 Id. at 30.
3 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 25, 1871.
[Vol. 68
THE Two JUSTICES HARLAN
tice will demonstrate that the "right result" was invariably
that the rights of the minority black must not be violated by
the tyranny of the white majority.
A. Justice Harlan I's Approach to Civil Rights and Liberties
During the period that Justice Harlan I was on the Su-
preme Court bench37 the Court faced several casks involving
challenges to the civil rights of the newly-freed blacks. It is in
this area that Justice Harlan I is best known, for it is here
that he took positions which were contrary to the views of all
other justices of the Court at the time," but which very much
represent the majority views of the Court since 1954. As the
lone dissenter in both the Civil Rights Cases35 and in Plessy v.
Ferguson,4" Harlan represented a voice in the wilderness in
support of a broad interpretation of the Civil War
Amendments.
1. Justice Harlan I and the Civil Rights Acts
A number of civil rights acts were passed by Congress to
implement the post-Civil War Amendments. The most direct
challenge to the constitutionality of these laws to come before
the Court after Harlan I's appointment were the Civil Rights
Cases involving two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.41
In its 9-1 opinion declaring these sections invalid, the majority
31 Justice Harlan served on the bench from 1877 to 1911.
u "Harlan almost never failed to uphold the civil rights of black plaintiffs, never
invalidated civil rights legislation when it pertained to freed blacks, and regularly
dissented from cases that left black petitioners without a remedy against either dis-
crimination by states or attacks by private citizens." G. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 133.
3, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" The first section of this act stated:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, thea-
tres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
The second section placed penalties on any person who violated this law by deny-
ing the aforementioned accommodations to any person for reason of race or previous
condition of servitude.
1979-801
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held that the enforcement section of the fourteenth amend-
ment only would allow the national government to pass legis-
lation to counteract the effects of discriminatory state laws.
The majority held that laws directly prohibiting private acts
of discrimination were not permitted by this section of the
amendment.4 2 Thus the Court held that Congress could not
constitutionally enact legislation which would make illegal
any action that violated the fourteenth amendment.13 Rather
the federal government must wait until a state governmental
institution had passed or enforced laws contrary to the four-
teenth amendment. 44 Once this occurred, Congress could pass
legislation to correct this situation in order to offset the effects
of the state action and to provide the victim of such action a
remedy.45
The Court held that the thirteenth amendment was inap-
plicable in the Civil Rights Cases. Congress had the power to
enforce this amendment through legislation, but legislation
aimed at prohibiting the denial to equal accommodations was
not the type of legislation permitted.46 The Court reached this
conclusion because the civil rights legislation did not involve
the imposition of badges of slavery or involuntary servitude on
the parties involved.47
109 U.S. at 11.
,5 Another important point is that the fourteenth amendment prohibits state ac-
tion only and these cases concerned the actions of private individuals outside state
authority, and thus outside the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Speaking for
the majority, Justice Bradley said:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority,
is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the
rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his
property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State,
or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress.
Id. at 17.
1 Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-41.
Id. at 24.
" Id. at 24. The Court reasoned:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters
of intercourse or business.
[Vol. 68
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In his dissent, Harlan argued that the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments not only prevented racial discrimina-
tion by state law and agencies of the state, but through their
enforcement clauses gave Congress the power to forbid dis-
criminatory acts by individuals and corporations exercising
public functions and wielding power under state authority."
Harlan stated that railroads were public highways and, even
though owned by private corporations, were established by the
authority of the state; thus the railroad operators had a re-
sponsibility to serve the public without discrimination.49 In the
matter of public amusements, Harlan pointed out that "a li-
cense from the public to establish a place of public amuse-
ment, imports, in law, equality of right, at such places, among
all the members of that public."5
The Civil War Amendments generated a great deal of
controversy over the intentions of their framers. Justice
Harlan argued that because the Amendments were drafted by
the same group in Congress who wrote the Civil Rights Acts,
one need merely to read the Acts to determine the intentions
of the drafters when they proposed the three new Constitu-
tional amendments. To Harlan it was beyond dispute that
these measures were drafted with the following purposes in
mind: to guarantee beyond question that the freedmen would
not continue to exist in a condition of servitude, that they
would be citizens of the United States with all the legal and
political rights and privileges which had been traditionally en-
joyed by the white man, and that they would not be hindered
in their desire to exercise their political power through the
sufferage. 51
Id. at 24-25.
' Id. at 43.
" Id. at 39.
5' Id. at 41. Harlan even justified this position on the principle expounded in
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 111 (1876), that property becomes "clothed with public in-
terest" when it is used in a public manner and affects the community at large. Thus
Congress could make it illegal for any owner or operator of a common accommodation
"to deny the full enjoyments of the accommodation thereof because of race or color."
109 U.S. at 42.
11 Id. at 35-36. Harlan noted the willingness of the Court to uphold the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 but not the Civil Rights Act of 1875. He argued that the same
reasoning which upheld federal protection of masters could be used to uphold the
1979-801
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Another case which demonstrates the conflict between
Harlan I and the other justices over interpretation of the Civil
Rights Acts and their relation to the Civil War Amendments is
that of Hodges v. United States,52 in which Hodges and others
were indicted in the United States District Court of Eastern
Arkansas for the crime of intimidation with the use of deadly
weapons of black citizens in the free exercise of their right to
obtain employment in a lumber plant. They were convicted in
the lower federal court of violating the Civil Rights Act of
1870.11 On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the convictions
rights of their former slaves. The rights of masters were protected by upholding the
Fugitive Slave Law under article IV and thus, by the same token, the Civil Rights
Laws should be upheld under the fourteenth amendment as protecting the rights of
the newly-freed slaves. Harlan believed that the fourteenth amendment was designed
to safeguard their rights just as much as article IV was designed to protect their
masters.
The force of Harlan's dissent in these cases makes the following observations in-
teresting and relevant:
His opinions are strong, well written and leave very little doubt as to what
he meant. . . . When he dissented he never hesitated to critise [sic] the
opinion of the Court. There was often a touch of indignation in the language
he used, and almost an inability to understand how his colleagues could
have differed from him, could be seen in each sentence. He had absolute
confidence in the correctness of his own opinion and with his great power of
judgment and vigor of expression made a wonderfully strong presentation of
his view of any case. . . . In questions concerning civil rights he was inflexi-
ble. . . . He was a fearless Judge-absolutely independent and determined
to do the right as he saw it.
Duke, John Marshall Harlan, 17 VA. L. REG. 497, 503-04 (1911).
52 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5 Shortly before Justice Harlan's appointment, the Court had declared invalid
two sections of the 1870 Act which made it a crime to interfere with the right to vote.
The Court held that since these provisions were not limited to denial of the right to
vote on the basis of race, they were therefore an invalid implementation of the
fifteenth amendment. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). The section applica-
ble in the Hodges case provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the
highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be
fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten
years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of
honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
§ 5508, Rev. Stat., reprinted in 203 U.S. at 5.
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on the ground that Congress can only prohibit state actions,
not those of private citizens.
In his dissent, Harlan I argued that the challenged sec-
tions of the act should be upheld under both the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments. The infringement of the right to
contract for one's own labor was slavery within the meaning of
the thirteenth amendment. 4 Harlan found support in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana55 for the argument that the acts of Hodges were a
11 Although in words and form prohibitive, yet, in law, by its own force, that
Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and estab-
lished freedom. It also conferred upon every person within the jurisdiction of
the United States (except those legally imprisoned for crime) the right,
without discrimination against them on account of their race, to enjoy all
the privileges that inhere in freedom. . . . So, legislation making it an of-
fense against the United States to conspire to injure or intimidate a citizen
in the free exercise of any right secured by the Constitution is broad enough
to embrace a conspiracy of the kind charged in the present indictment.
Id. at 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan quoted from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879): "A right
of immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, may be
protected by Congress." Harlan pointed out that similar views were expressed by the
Court majority in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842) and United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
To support his view that the thirteenth amendment not only protected individu-
als from the incidents of slavery, Harlan quoted liberally from the majority opinion in
the Civil Rights Cases in which Justice Bradley enunciated what constitutes the
"badges and incidents of slavery" which the thirteenth amendment was designed to
prevent. Among them was the disability to make contracts. Harlan then asked:
If the Thirteenth Amendment established freedom and conferred, without
the aid of legislation, the right to be free from the badges and incidents of
slavery, and if the disability to make or enforce contracts for one's personal
services was a badge of slavery, as it existed when the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was adopted, how is it possible to say that the combination or conspir-
acy charged in the present indictment, and conclusively established by the
verdict and judgment, was not in hostility to rights secured by the
constitution?
203 U.S. at 35.
Jacobus ten Broek supports this view:
The striking thing then about the Thirteenth Amendment is that it was
intended by its drafters and sponsors as a consummation to abolitionism in
the broad sense in which thirty years of agitation and organized activity had
defined that movement. The Amendment was seen by its drafter and spon-
sors as doing the whole job . . .
J. TEN BROEK, THE ANT-SLAvERY ORIGINS oF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 179-80
(1951), reprinted in ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 200 (1951).
ss 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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violation of the fourteenth amendment. In Allgeyer, the Court
had interpreted the word "liberty" in the due process clause to
include
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citiken to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways; to live and work when he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter all contracts which
may be proper, necessary and essential to the carrying out to
a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
Although Harlan I recognized that the foregoing referred to
state action, he asserted that this definition of liberty was
nothing more nor less than the freedom established by the
thirteenth amendment; thus, that amendment prohibited its
violation by private individuals. Anyone who is deprived of
the foregoing rights because of his race is hindered in the exer-
cise of rights secured to freemen by the thirteenth amend-
ment.5 7 Thus the Hodges case re-emphasized Justice Harlan's
defense of individual rights as he supported blacks in their
struggle to achieve equality of opportunity.
2. The Separate but Equal Doctrine
No case clarifies the unique position of Justice Harlan I
on civil rights more vividly than Plessy v. Ferguson,'s in which
the "separate but equal" doctrine was established. In 1890,
the state of Louisiana enacted a statute requiring segregation
"1 Id. at 589, quoted at 203 U.S. at 36. In examining Harlan's views, one author
made the following observation:
He believed that they should occupy the position that historically they were
intended to occupy by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. He be-
lieved that the law should be interpreted as it was meant and not as the
court thought expedient and wise. Though it may be true that his relation
to the negro in political matters may have made him more violent in his
dissents, any one who will look fairly at the question must conclude that his
doctrine was legally correct.
F. CLARK, THE CONSTrrUrIONAL DocrRNES OF JusTIcE HARLAN 137 (1915).
'T 203 U.S. at 36.
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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on railroad passenger coaches based on race." The law was at-
tacked on the ground that it violated the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments. Plessy, seven-eights Caucasian and one-
eighth Negro, being a passenger between two points within the
state, was assigned by railroad officers to the coach used by
those of the colored race, but he insisted that he had a right to
sit in the coach reserved for whites. He was ejected from the
train and placed in the parish jail to answer the charges of
having violated the act.
The majority of the Court, with Justice Brown as spokes-
man, disposed immediately of the charge that the act violated
the thirteenth amendment. That the act was not such a viola-
tion was considered too clear for argument; in fact, the Court
felt that even the plaintiff was not relying heavily on such a
position."0 The majority saw no relation between involuntary
servitude and the provisions of the Louisiana statute. "A stat-
ute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary
servitude."" The Court held that the law was still valid be-
cause the fourteenth amendment demanded nothing more
than the legal equality of the races.6"
Harlan based his dissent on his belief that the Louisiana
statute was nothing less than an attempt to thwart the free-
doms guaranteed the Negro race by the Civil War Amend-
ments. The thirteenth amendment, according to Harlan, was
designed to prevent "the imposition of any burdens or disabil-
ities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude." 3 In con-
junction with the fourteenth amendment, the thirteenth
1" The law provided that "all railway companies carrying passengers in their
coaches in this State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches in each passenger
train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate
accommodations," except for street railways. A fine or imprisonment was provided for
if a railway officer or a passenger refused to abide by the provisions of this law. The
only persons specifically exempted were nurses attending children of another race.
1890 La. Acts, No. 111 §§ 1, 3.
60 163 U.S. at 542.
" Id. at 543.
62 Id. at 544.
Id. at 555.
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amendment also protected all civil rights that pertain to free-
dom and citizenship. To Harlan, the Louisiana statute and
other similar legislation excluding blacks from various activi-
ties had the effect of placing blacks in the condition of a "sub-
ject race."64 The fact that the statute technically applied to
blacks and whites alike did not persuade Harlan:
Everyone knows that the statute in question has its ori-
gin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons
from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white per-
sons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make dis-
crimination among whites in the matter of accommodation
for travellers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise
of giving equal accomodations for whites and blacks, to com-
pel the latter to keep to themselves while travelling in rail-
road passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in can-
dor as to assert the contrary. 5
Harlan's basic objection to the statute was that it inter-
fered with the individual liberty of citizens. Black and white
citizens who wished to travel together should have every right
to do so, and any government which forbade it on the ground
of race was infringing on these citizen's individual liberty as
certain as a law which would forbid both races equal use of the
streets." The point that Harlan expressed most eloquently in
his dissent is that the Constitution does not recognize a
"caste" system and that any laws which create such a system
are unconstitutional.
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens. . . .The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaran-
teed by the supreme law of the land are involved.67
64 Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
I d.
Id. at 559.
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Speaking prophetically, Harlan stated, "In my opinion,
the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite
as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott case."68 Harlan viewed the legislation as a direct
barrier to solving racial friction.
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more cer-
tainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between
these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed
on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and de-
graded that they can not be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the
real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana.6
Running like a thread throughout Harlan's dissenting
opinion is his refusal to accept a narrow definition of the
phrase "civil rights." To consider the rights of blacks in this
case as merely "social," rather than "legal" or "political," and
consequently unworthy of constitutional protection was to
Harlan a position beyond consideration." Harlan condemned
the Court for upholding a law which "practically, puts the
brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our
fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disquise of
'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done. 71
" Id.
" Id. at 560.
70 Id. at 561. Harlan noted:
This question is not met by the suggestion that social equality cannot exist
between the white and black races in this country ... for social equality no
more exists between two races travelling in a passenger coach or a public
highway than when members of the same race sit by each other in a street
car or in the jury box ... or when they approach the ballot-box to exercise
the high privilege of voting.
Id.
7' Id. at 562. One of the clearest statements by Harlan relative to his views con-
ceming discrimination was made in a dissenting opinion in which the Court had up-
held a Kentucky statute making it illegal for a college to teach both white and black
students. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an American gov-
ernment, professedly based on the principles of freedom, and charged with
the protection of all citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citi-
zens in the matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes simply
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B. Nationalization of the Bill of Rights
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights
was limited during Justice Harlan I's tenure to the question of
whether these rights were applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 2 Since the
Court did not deal with the meaning of the first amendment,
as such, until after World War I,73 civil liberties considerations
focused on whether the procedural due process rights of per-
sons accused of crime were "nationalized," that is, binding on
state courts to the extent that they were binding on the fed-
eral courts. The following cases demonstrate that Justice
Harlan I took a position in support of total incorporation of
the Bill of Rights as a lone dissenter-a position which was
opposed not only by his grandson, but by nearly all other Jus-
tices of the Court.
One of the earlier cases in this group, and probably the
most famous, is Hurtado v. California.74 California's constitu-
tion provided that indictment by the grand jury might be re-
placed by an indictment by information; the California legis-
lature passed a law implementing this change. On February
20, 1882, the district attorney of Sacramento County made
and filed an information against Hurtado, charging him with
murder. In May, Hurtado was brought to trial and convicted
of murder in the first degree, with the day of execution fixed
for July 20. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
judgment of the district court. After a second execution date
because of their respective races? Further, if the lower court be right, then a
State may make it a crime for white and colored persons to frequent the
same market places at the same time, or appear in an assemblage of citi-
zens convened to consider questions of a public or political nature in which
all citizens, without regard to race, are equally interested. Many other illus-
trations might be given to show the mischievous, not to say cruel, character
of the statute in question and how inconsistent such legislation is with the
great principle of the equality of citizens before the law.
Id. at 69.
72 "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 The incorporation of the provisions of the first amendment has been settled
matter for some time. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
74 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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had been set and another appeal entered, the case was finally
brought to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of er-
ror. In upholding the California statute, the majority held that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment had not intended to
include all the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the word "lib-
erty" of the due process clause. The Court held that what con-
stitutes due process of law varies from state to state according
to the view of each state legislature. The important factor is
that each state interpret due process so as to preserve the ele-
ments of a "fair" trial; and what is "fair" is not to be mea-
sured by a particular form or procedure. 75 The Court reasoned
that if the intention had been to apply grand jury indictments
to state procedures, it would have been specifically provided
for in the fifth amendment.78
Justice Harlan I, in his dissenting opinion, traced the ori-
gins of due process to the Magna Carta and in its phrase "by
the law of the land."77 He also quoted freely from English and
American jurists and political leaders to demonstrate that the
rights of Englishmen were also the rights of the colonists. 71
Both Harlan and the Court agreed that "due process" applies
to both state and federal governments, but contention focused
on the interpretation of that phrase. The Court held then, as
it has ever since, that due process means "fundamental fair-
ness"; thus there has been an adherence to "selective" incor-
poration rather than the total incorporation that Harlan advo-
cated. Harlan maintained that if the states could abolish an
indictment by grand jury they likewise could ignore the guar-
antees against double jeopardy and compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.79 It is interesting to note that later courts did precisely
what Harlan said they would not do, by allowing states to dis-
regard the double jeopardy and self-incrimination provisions,
as in Palko v. Connecticut"0 and Adamson v. California."1
' Id. at 535-36.
7' Id. at 535.
Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7' Id. at 543-45.
" Id. at 547.
" 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy).
" 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (self-incrimination).
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In Maxwell v. Dow, 2 Harlan again argued for total incor-
poration of the Bill of Rights. In Maxwell, the state of Utah
had convicted a defendant of a felony by an eight-man jury
instead of the twelve-man jury required in federal courts. The
majority held that a state had as much right to alter the num-
ber of a petit jury as it did to abolish the grand jury, as in
Hurtado.83 The Court held that the privileges and immunities
clause did not apply to this state law and that the defendant's
due process rights were not denied. 84
Harlan urged in Maxwell that both the privileges and im-
munities clause"5 and the due process clause" of the fourteenth
amendment precluded the trial process adopted in Utah.
Harlan noted that if the jury could be reduced to eight mem-
bers without violating the fourteenth amendment, then a state
could reduce the number to three jurors.87 Harlan maintained
that not only was the sixth amendment incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment, but so was the remaining Bill of
Rights. 88
With a trace of irony, Harlan also pointed out that be-
cause many decisions upheld property rights under the due
process clause, it was not unreasonable to expect the Court to
use the clause to protect the life and liberty of the citizen." He
argued:
n 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 602-03.
84 Id.
Harlan explained:
It does not solve the question before us to say that the first ten amend-
ments had reference only to the powers of the National Government and not
to the powers of the States. For if prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment it was one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States that they should not be tried for crimes in any court organ-
ized or existing under National authority except by a jury of twelve persons,
how can it be that a citizen of the United States may be now tried in a state
court for crime . . . by eight jurors, when that amendment expressly de-
clares that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States?"
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
87 Id. at 612.
Id. at 614-17.
11 Id. at 614.
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If then the 'due process of law' required by the Four-
teenth Amendment does not allow a State to take private
property without just compensation, but does allow the life
or liberty of the citizen to be taken in a mode that is repug-
nant to the settled usages and the modes of proceeding au-
thorized at the time the Constitution was adopted and which
was expressly forbidden in the National Bill of Rights, it
would seem that the protection of private property is of more
consequence than the protection of the life and liberty of the
citizen."
Justice Harlan expressed his impatience toward those mem-
bers of the Court who would permit nothing to threaten the
rights of property but would not condemn judicial procedures
which placed an individual defendant's life or liberty in
jeopardy.
Harlan voiced concern that if the states could take away
one right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, they could take
away all others. In the following statement we find the clearest
expression of Harlan's position in favor of complete nationali-
zation of the Bill of Rights:
The right to be tried when charged with a crime by a
jury of twelve persons is placed by the Constitution upon the
same basis as the other rights specified in the first ten
amendments. And while those amendments, originally lim-
ited only the powers of the National Government . . .since
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges
and immunities are, in my opinion, also guarded against in-
fringement by the States."
Harlan viewed the Bill of Rights as sacred elements of lib-
erty, and he found it inconceivable that simply because a de-
fendant was tried in a state court he should enjoy less protec-
tion than if the trial were held in federal court. In Maxwell,
Harlan in his lone dissent stated that "[ilt does not solve the
question before us to say that the [Bill of Rights] had refer-
ence only to the powers of the national government and not to
the state."92 Harlan warned in his conclusion of the far-reach-
9Id.
, Id. at 616-17.
92 Id. at 612.
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ing consequences of the Maxwell decision:
I take it no one doubts that the great men who laid the foun-
dations of our government regarded the preservation of the
privileges and immunities specified in the [Bill of Rights] as
vital to the personal security of American citizens. To say of
any people that they do not enjoy those privileges and im-
munities is to say that they do not enjoy real freedom ....
• .. [TIhe Constitution of the United States does not
stand in the way of any state striking down guarantees of life
and liberty that English-speaking people have for centuries
regarded as vital to personal security, and which the men of
the revolutionary period universally claimed as the birth-
right of freemen. 3
Another famous case regarding nationalization of the Bill
of Rights was Twining v. New Jersey,94 in which Harlan I dis-
sented once again. In Twining, defendants, who were con-
victed of fraud, invoked their right not to take the stand in
their own defense. The judge instructed the jury that it could
take into consideration the failure of the accused to defend
themselves. The question of whether the guarantee against
self-incrimination was incorporated into the due process
clause was answered by the Court in the negative on the basis
that it was not regarded as a fundamental right.15 Harlan I
vigorously dissented in an opinion later to be adopted by a
majority of the Court.
"[Ilt is common knowledge," argued Harlan in Twining,
"that the compelling of a person to incriminate himself shocks
or ought to shock the sense of right and justice of every one
who loves liberty."97 To Harlan, the majority's narrow inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment would prevent that
amendment from discouraging the violation of other rights by
the states. "[A]s I read the opinion of the court," Harlan
commented,
" Id. at 615-17.
94 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 107-110.
" Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
" 211 U.S. at 123.
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the Fourteenth Amendment would be no obstacle whatever
in the way of a state law or practice under which, for in-
stance, cruel or unusual punishments (such as the thumb
screw, or the rack or burning at the stake) might be in-
flicted. So of a state law which infringed the right of free
speech, or authorized unreasonable searches or seizures of
persons, their houses, papers or effects, or a state law under
which one accused of crime could be put in jeopardy twice or
oftener, at the pleasure of the prosecution, for the same
offense."
"1 Id. at 125. In other cases Harlan I consistently argued for extension of the Bill
of Rights. For example, he argued as a dissenter in support of the incorporation of the
right of a unanimous verdict by a petit jury in the annexed Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting). To Harlan, the "Constitu-
tion follows the flag," therefore the Bill of Rights applied to any lands coming under
United States jurisdiction. Id. at 239. According to the majority, the annexation reso-
lution continued the existing laws and judicial procedures of the Islands, so far as
they were not contrary to the United States Constitution, until Congress should deter-
mine otherwise. The guarantee of a unanimous verdict by a petit jury provided in
federal court procedure was not regarded by the majority as a fundamental right. Id.
at 218.
In Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), a case involving double jeop-
ardy, the defendant was acquitted of embezzlement. On appeal the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, pursuant to a military order allowing appeals from acquittals, re-
versed the lower court decision and sentenced him to prison. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed this action holding that double jeopardy had occurred. Double
jeopardy was held invalid here because Congress had repealed the military order when
setting up a civilian government; this congressional act provided immunity from
double jeopardy. Id. at 133-34. Justice Harlan concurred without comment, but in
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting), he stated that
the reason for his concurrence had been that he felt that when the Philippines had
been acquired its inhabitants became entitled to all the rights of the Bill of Rights,
thus the existence of a military government order was irrelevant. Id. at 535.
In Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting), another
Philippine Islands case, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute of
Congress expressly conferring the right of trial by jury, the right is not a necessary
implement in judicial procedure in the Philippine Islands. The majority held that
trial by jury is not a fundamental right, following the reasoning in the Mankichi case.
Id. at 148-49. Three of the four dissenters in Mankichi joined the majority in Dorr
because of the Mankichi decision. One dissenter, however, maintained his posi-
tion-Harlan. He remained adamant in his view that
guarantees for the protection of life, liberty and property, as embodied in
the Constitution, are for the benefit of all, of whatever race or nativity, in
the States composing the Union, or in any territory, however acquired, over
the inhabitants of which the Government of the United States may exercise
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.
Id. at 154. In the Trono case, referred to above, Harlan dissented from a majority
decision which held that a second trial could result in a stiffer penalty than in the
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11. JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN II
Justice Harlan II was born in Chicago in 1899, the son of
John Maynard Harlan, a prominent Chicago attorney, and the
grandson of Harlan I. In 1920 he received his A.B. degree from
Princeton. A Rhodes Scholar, Harlan spent three years at Bal-
liol College, Oxford, where he received B.A. and M.A. degrees.
He also studied law at Balliol College, and completed his law
studies at New York Law School." Harlan II worked in the
New York law firm of Root, Clark, Buckner and Howland, ex-
cept for two years spent with the staff of Emory Buckner, who
was United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York.10 Harlan remained at Root, Clark until 1942, attaining
partnership status in 1931.01 "
During World War II, Harlan served as a colonel in charge
of the Operational Analysis Section of the Eighth Air Force in
England. This section was composed of civilian experts in a
variety of fields who had been assembled to advise the com-
mander of the force responsible for the United States' share of
the bombing operations in Europe. ' After the war, Harlan re-
turned to private practice where he specialized in corporate
law.
In 1954 Harlan was appointed by President Eisenhower to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
replace the illustrious Augustus Hand.10 3 In November of that
year, President Eisenhower appointed Harlan to the United
States Supreme Court to succeed Justice Jackson.104 Many
original trial when the appeal is instituted by the defendant. The Court held that a
defendant waives his right against double jeopardy when he appeals a decision. 199
U.S. at 533. In his dissent Harlan argued that acquittal in the court of first instance
of the serious crime of murder made consideration of the charge by a higher court
constitute double jeopardy. The fact that the appeal was brought by the accused was
immaterial to Justice Harlan. Id. at 536.
" EVOLUTION, supra note 14, at xviii. David Shapiro presented an excellent bio-
graphical sketch of Harlan II in a Biographical Note included in EvOLUTIoN at xvii.
For the brief background information presented here the author is indebted to that
source and it is suggested that it be consulted for additional facts concerning Harlan
I's biography.
100 Id.
,1 Id. at xx.
,o* Id. at xxii.
' Id. at xxii-xxiii.
io Id. at xxiii.
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southern senators were leery of Harlan because of his grandfa-
ther's position on civil rights while he served on the Supreme
Court. Conservatives opposed him because of the fear that he
would be a "One Worlder," since he had been a Rhodes
Scholar and a member (though inactive) of the Atlantic Union
Committee which advocated closer alliance with NATO coun-
tries. Senator Eastland of Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, opposed him, saying, "[W]orld Govern-
ment is the issue in this case." The Daughters of the Ameri-
can Revolution opposed him because of his defense of what it
referred to as the "well-known leftist 'Bertram' Russell."' 0 5 In
spite of this opposition, Harlan H's nomination was confirmed
in March 1955,108 and he remained on the bench until his re-
tirement in 1971.
Justice Harlan II came to the Court when its involvement
with civil liberties was at its height. His response to the diffi-
cult problems of racial discrimination and the plight of the
criminal defendant has been described as conservative;'" such
a label is generally inappropriate because of his sensitivity to
the "importance of protecting the fundamental freedoms of
the individual from impairment by any governmental body,
state or federal."'' 0 This section will examine representative
opinions by Harlan II as contrasted with the decisions of his
grandfather. Thus, focus will be on cases concerning civil
rights and nationalization of the Bill of Rights. As this discus-
sion will demonstrate, the pattern which emerges in Harlan
]'s opinions is "attributable in part to his fear that the judici-
ary will arrogate excessive authority in a system marked by a
separation of powers, and his concern lest the Congress, the
legal profession and the general public lose confidence in the
judiciousness and self-restraint of the members of the
Court." 0"
"I Id. at xxiv. Harlan had defended Russell against the Board of Higher Educa-
tion which had cancelled Russell's contract to teach at City College. Id. at xx.
I Id.
'°' Ledbetter, Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties, 20 S.C. L.
REv. 389, 405 (1968).
's EVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 1.
,0, Dorsen, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: Tnxm LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2803, 2806-07 (1969).
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A. Civil Rights and Justice Harlan II
In the area of civil rights, a diversity of cases came before
the United States Supreme Court during Justice Harlan H's
tenure. First were the cases which involved challenges to the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960's, includ-
ing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,"' and Katzen-
bach v. McClung."'1 In both decisions Harlan joined a unani-
mous Court in upholding the 1964 Act." 2 In another group of
cases, Harlan joined a unanimous Court in upholding the im-
plementation of the school desegregation decision in Brown v.
Board of Education"' by striking down the closing of schools
in Prince Edward County, Virginia, to avoid integration,' in
upholding federal court orders requiring school integration in
Little Rock, Arkansas,' and in upholding school busing plans
in Holmes County, Mississippi"6 and in Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg, North Carolina."7 In fact, in the Charlotte case, Swann
v. Board of Education, the Court upheld busing and racial
quotas and gerrymandering to remove "all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation.""' Most important for analytical pur-
poses here are the cases in which the Court dealt with the con-
stitutionality of state and local anti-trespass laws which were
invoked against students participating in sit-in demonstra-
tions during the civil rights movement in the 1950's and
1960's.
1. Anti-Trespass Laws and the Federal System
Justice Harlan II was most often at odds with the major-
ity of the Court in his views concerning state and local anti-
trespass statutes. He sided consistently with those who fa-
vored upholding these laws, with the effect of aligning himself
110 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
"' 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
"' In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court upheld Title VII
(Fair Employment) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
113 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
'" Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
" Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
,, Id. at 15.
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with the dissenters in some cases"' and with the majority in
others.'20 An analysis of these cases illustrates that for Justice
Harlan II the element of federalism "inherent in our constitu-
tional structure, is an essential aspect of the division of gov-
ernmental authority that serves to safeguard the individual
from the dangers of monolithic rule. '12'
In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, '2 2 students were arrested
and convicted of violating state trespass laws when they "sat-
in" at a lunch counter in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The
Court majority held the convictions invalid because the 1964
Civil Rights Act made state trespass laws invalid as they ap-
plied to public accommodations refusing to serve customers on
the basis of race.tn The Court, in a 5-4 decision, stated that:
[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in
places of public accommodation and removes peaceful at-
tempts to be served on an equal basis from the category of
punishable activities. Although the conduct in the present
cases 2 occurred prior to enactment of the Act, the still-
pending convictions are abated by its passage.'1
The key point espoused by the majority was that under the
supremacy clause the federal Civil Rights Act requires that all
contrary state laws no longer stand.2 1
Harlan II, in his Hamm dissent, attacked the majority's
view that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 abated the criminal
trespass laws of the states as they applied to sit-in demonstra-
tions. Harlan agreed that:
[Tihe abatement doctrine serves a useful and appropriate
"I Brown v. Louisiana, 393 U.S. 131 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting).
11 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808
(1966).
121 EVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 1.
' 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"2 Id. at 308.
M24 The Court is referring to two actions dealt with simultaneously: the lunch
counter in Rock Hill, and a tearoom in the Gus Blass Company's department store in
Little Rock, Arkansas.
115 Id. at 308 (footnote added).
I Id. at 315.
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purpose in a framework of the legislation of a single political
sovereignty. The doctrine strikes a jarring note, however,
when it is applied so as to affect the legislation of a different
sovereignty, as the federal doctrine is now used to abate
these state convictions. Our federal system tolerates wide
differences between state and federal legislative policies, and
the presumption of retroactive exculpation that readily at-
taches to a federal criminal statute which unreservedly re-
peals earlier federal legislation cannot, in my opinion, be au-
tomatically thought to embrace exoneration from earlier
wrongdoing under a state statute.'1
Harlan declared that he would not decide whether such state
racial trespass laws would be valid after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. He simply found no evidence that
Congress intended to have the Civil Rights Act pre-empt such
trespass laws enacted before 1964.125
In Bell v. Maryland,2 1 another trespass case, the Court
reversed the conviction of twelve black students who were in-
volved in a sit-in demonstration and who refused to leave a
Baltimore restaurant, thus violating Maryland's criminal tres-
pass law. Between the time the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed their conviction and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, the state of Maryland passed a pub-
lic accomodations statute making it unlawful for restaurants
to deny services to any person because of race. In a 6-3 deci-
sion, the Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case
to the state court so that it might consider the effect of the
new public accommodations law. 3'
Justice Harlan II did not write a dissenting opinion but
'' Id. at 323-24.
'' Id. at 325.
378 U.S. 226 (1964). The sit-in occurred in 1960.
' Id. at 242. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas sounds like Justice Harlan
I-
Segregation of Negroes in the restaurants and lunch counters of parts of
America is a relic of slavery. It is a badge of second-class citizenship. It is a
denial of a privilege and immunity of national citizenship and of the equal
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment
by the States. When the state police, the state prosecutor, and the state
courts unite to convict Negroes for renouncing that relic of slavery, the
"State" violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 260.
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joined the dissenting views of Justice Black that the four-
teenth amendment "does not forbid a State to prosecute for
crimes committed against a person or his property, however
prejudiced or narrow the victim's views may be."13' Rather,
United States citizens "have been taught to call for police pro-
tection to protect their rights whenever possible."'3 A citizen
is not "cast outside the law's protection" because of his "per-
sonal prejudices, habits, attitudes, or beliefs. .... "I
Our sole conclusion is that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, standing alone, does not prohibit privately
owned restaurants from choosing their own customs. It
does not destroy what has until very recently been univer-
sally recognized in this country as the unchallenged right
of a man who owns a business to run the business in his
own way so long as some valid regulatory statute does not
tell him to do otherwise.'34
In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 135 a companion case decided
with Hamm, the Court in a 6-3 decision again overturned the
conviction of sit-in demonstrators, with Justices Harlan and
White concurring in a dissenting opinion written by Justice
Black. Here, two black college students entered a Columbia,
South Carolina, drug store which extended service to blacks in
all departments except its restaurant. The students sat down
and refused to leave when asked to do so. They were arrested
and convicted of trespassing, and the conviction was upheld
by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Speaking for the Court in Bouie, Justice Brennan reversed
the conviction on the ground that the students, having been
permitted to enter the drug store and be served in all depart-
ments but the restaurant, were not given fair warning of a
criminal prohibition required by the trespass statute, thus
their conviction was a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.'36 Justice Brennan stated that
"I Id. at 327-28.
132 Id.
"1 Id. at 343.
134 Id.
12 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
,1 Id. at 350.
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there was nothing in the statute to indicate that it also pro-
hibited refusal to leave the premises when ordered to do So.137
Again, Harlan joined a dissent by Black in which the ra-
tionale of state trespass laws was further explained:
[I]t has long been accepted as the common law of that State
that a person who enters upon the property of another by
invitation becomes a trespasser if he refuses to leave when
asked to do so. We cannot believe that either the petitioners
or anyone else could have been misled by the language of
this statute into believing that it would permit them to stay
on the property of another over the owner's protest without
being guilty of trespass.'
The dissents in these cases illustrate two interrelated
points about Harlan's judicial approach. First, the balance be-
tween state and federal government must be preserved; and,
secondly, the state has the power to enact legislation aimed at
protecting the property of its citizens. That the statutes may
be invoked for prejudicial motives of exclusion of a certain
race from entering private property is irrelevant to the validity
of the law in question. Justice Harlan I undoubtedly would
have agreed with the majority in these cases; the ability to
invoke state laws to exclude systematically members of a cer-
tain race from private business open to the public is essen-
tially another manifestation of the "separate but equal doc-
trine." Justice Harlan II adopted a dispassionate view of the
fact that the law is used in support of actions apparently dis-
criminatory in nature. He struck his balance in favor of under-
girding the federal system.
2. Fair-Housing Statutes and Equal Protection
Justice Harlan II's dissenting opinion in Reitman v.
Mulkey"9 further illustrates his somewhat detached attitude
toward laws which foster racial discrimination. The Reitman
case involved an amendment to California's constitution, sup-
ported by the electorate in an initiative and referendum,
'3 Id. at 362.
'u Id. at 366-67. (footnotes omitted).
139 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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which would forbid the state to deny anyone the right to sell
his or her property to whomever he or she chooses.'40 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held this referendum to be a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In a
5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
California Supreme Court decision. The Court, in a decision
by Justice White, held that according to the Supreme Court of
California, Proposition 14, the relevant constitutional amend-
ment, not only repealed existing fair housing laws but also au-
thorized racial discrimination as a state policy. Thus, the
state was involved in discrimination through its involvement
and encouragement via this provision.'4'
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clark, Black
and Stewart, Justice Harlan II declared that he was "wholly
at a loss to understand how this straightforward effectuation
of a change in the California Constitution [could] be deemed a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."'4 2 Adopting the
same position as that assumed in the anti-trespass cases,
Harlan emphasized the futility in attempting to eradicate ra-
cial prejudice and discrimination by utilization of the equal
protection clause.
The Equal Protection Clause . . .which forbids a State to
use its authority to foster discrimination based on factors
such as race ...does not undertake to control purely per-
sonal prejudices and predilections, and individuals acting on
their own are left free to discriminate on racial grounds if
they are so minded.'
Harlan felt that California, "acting through the initiative and
referendum, [had] decided to remain 'neutral' in the realm of
private discrimination affecting the sale or rental of private
" Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is will-
ing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to
decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he,
in his absolute discretion, chooses.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26, quoted at 387 U.S. at 371.
' 387 U.S. at 374-75.
,42 Id. at 388-89.
"3 Id.
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residential property." ' California simply repealed its previ-
ously enacted fair-housing statutes, which was no more uncon-
stitutional than a state's failure to have passed the laws in the
first place. Harlan argued that the fourteenth amendment
should not be used as a device to invalidate Proposition 14:
The fact that such repeal was also accompanied by a
constitutional prohibition against future enactment of such
laws by the California Legislature cannot well be thought to
affect, from a federal constitutional standpoint, the validity
of what California has done. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not reach such state constitutional action any more
than it does a simple legislative repeal of legislation forbid-
ding private discrimination.'
To the claim of the majority that the referendum consti-
tuted in effect a state endorsement of private discrimination,
Harlan responded that there were no findings of fact as to
what the referendum's effect would be. A law's constitutional
validity is determined
by what the law does, not by what those who voted for it
wanted it to do, and it must not be forgotten that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not compel a State to put or keep
any particular law about race on its books. The Amendment
only forbids a State to pass or keep in effect laws discrimi-
nating on account of race. California has not done this.
A state enactment, particularly one that is simply per-
missive of private decision-making rather than coercive and
one that has been adopted in this most democratic of
processes, should not be struck down by the judiciary under
the Equal Protection Clause without persuasive evidence of
an invidious purpose or effect.' 6
Harlan concluded that the Court majority's argument
that adoption of the amendment constituted state encourage-
ment of discrimination established a principle which could
make passage of future anti-discrimination laws difficult. Op-
ponents of future laws could argue that a state would be una-
ble to ever repeal the legislation lest it be charged with en-
14 Id.
' Id. at 389.
. Id. at 390-91.
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couraging discrimination, thus violating the equal protection
clause. '47
It is apparent that Harlan II assumed a strict construc-
tionist's view regarding the California amendment. He saw no
state-imposed or encouraged discrimination on its face: "The
amendment is by its terms inoffensive, and its provisions re-
quire no affirmative governmental enforcement of any sort.'
4 8
" Id. at 395.
U Id. at 392. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
which is indirectly related to the civil rights movement, Harlan II dissented from a
decision which overturned the action of the state of Virginia against the activities of
the NAACP. The NAACP maintained an action to enjoin the enforcement of a Vir-
ginia statute which prohibited agents of organizations from soliciting legal business in
connection with an action to which it was not itself a party and in which it had no
pecuniary right or liability. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the appli-
cability and constitutionality of the statute. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 428.
Justice Harlan II dissented, arguing that it was not unreasonable for a state to
enforce the American Bar Association's canon of ethics which forbids a lawyer from
soliciting business. He felt that it was proper for the NAACP to acquaint blacks with
their rights and to advise them to assert those rights through legal proceedings, but
that it was also proper for the state to forbid the NAACP from soliciting business for
their lawyers. Id. at 448-49. "The interest which Virginia has here asserted is that of
maintaining high professional standards among those who practice law within its bor-
ders." Id. at 455. Harlan also argued that the state has a right to prevent "ambu-
lance-chasing" and to utilize such a statute for protection of the attorney-client
relationship:
When an attorney is employed by an association or corporation to re-
present individual litigants . . . Itihe lawyer becomes subject to the control
of a body that is not itself a litigant and that, unlike the lawyers it employs,
is not subject to strict professional discipline as an officer of the court. In
addition, the lawyer necessarily finds himself with a divided allegiance-to
his employer and to his client-which may prevent full compliance with his
basic professonal obligations.
Id. at 460.
Harlan illustrated this idea by raising a hypothetical problem: a Black parent
might want to attack segregation through discussions with the local school board or
allow the local authorities a longer time for compliance, while the NAACP might push
for an immediate lawsuit. In such a situation the lawyer would be torn in his alle-
giance between the organization which pays his salary and the client. Placed in jeop-
ardy is "that undivided allegience that is the hallmark of the attorney-client rela-
tion," and the state has a right to guarantee that undivided allegience by statute. Id.
at 462.
Harlan also denied that the Virginia statute had a detrimental effect on freedom
of expression and association. Speaking specifically to this point, he stated:
The important function of organizations like the petitioner in vindicating
constitutional rights is not of course to be minimized, but that function is
not, in my opinion, substantially impaired by this statute. Of cardinal im-
1979-801
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In Reitman Harlan II exemplified the non-activist, the
thoughtful, precise examiner of a state action that he felt fell
within what may, on its face, be reasonable action based on
motives which cannot be proved to be sinister or
discriminatory.
B. Nationalization of the Bill of Rights: Justice Harlan and
Fundamental Fairness
On no other issue in this study in judicial contrasts be-
tween the two Justices Harlan is the difference more apparent
than on the subject of the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. In fact, Justice
Frankfurter in Adamson v. California'49 referred to Justice
Harlan I when he stated that there had been only one "eccen-
tric exception" to the Court's refusal to accept total incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights. Harlan II was opposed not only to
total incorporation but even to the selective incorporation ap-
proach adopted by the Court majority. In discussing civil
rights as the subject relates to the applicability of the Bill of
Rights to state government, Harlan II stated that "there is no
such thing in our constitutional jurisprudence as a doctrine of
civil rights at large standing independent of other constitu-
tional limitations or giving rise to rights born only out of the
personal predilections of judges as to what is good." ' Promot-
ing the principles of federalism involves the toleration, even
encouragement, of "differences between federal and state pro-
tection of individual rights, so long as the differing policies
alike are founded in reason and do not run afoul of dictates of
fundamental fairness."' 5' One commentator has noted the
portance, this regulatory enactment as construed does not in any way sup-
press assembly, or advocacy of litigation in general or in particular. More-
over, contrary to the majority's suggestion, it does not, in my view, prevent
petitioner from recommending the services of attorneys who are not subject
to its directions and control. And since petitioner may contribute to those
who need assistance, the prohibition should not significantly discourage
anyone with sufficient interest from pressing his claims in litigation or from
joining with others similarly situated to press those claims.
Id. at 465. (footnote omitted).
' 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
,30 Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution, 50 ABA J. 918, 920 (1964).
151 Id.
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"traditional notion implicit in the concept of federalism that
the state shall play a large and important role in ordering the
lives of its citizens,' ' 1 2 and Justice Harlan's position is that
the Bill of Rights must be interpreted and applied in accor-
dance with this principle inherent in the balance of federal-
ism. Harlan maintained that so long as state policy was fun-
damentally fair to the individual, the national Bill of Rights
should have no application.
1. Due Process and State Criminal Procedure
The opinions of Justice Harlan II in cases concerning is-
sues of the administration of criminal justice reveal "his phi-
losophy of due process and his attitudes about that clause and
its relationship to civil liberties.' 5 3 His views are forcefully ex-
plained in Duncan v. Louisiana, 5 in which Gary Duncan had
been convicted of battery in a Louisiana court, an offense pun-
ishable by two years in prison and a fine of $300. During the
trial Duncan had requested and was denied a jury. He ap-
pealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, which
upheld Duncan's claim by a 7-2 decision. Said Justice White
for the majority: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be
tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee."'55
Harlan II, in dissent, maintained that "[Tihe question in
this case is whether the State of Louisiana, which provides
trial by jury for all felonies, is prohibited by the Constitution
from trying charges of simple battery to the court alone. In my
view, the answer . . . is clearly 'no.' "15 To Harlan the ques-
tion was nothing more than whether the trial process was
fair.'57 He felt that primary responsibility for criminal justice
procedures had always been with state judicial systems, and
were limited only by provisions of the Constitution, such as
I Ledbetter, supra note 107, at 390.
' Id. at 396.
" 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
', Id. at 149.
'' Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,17 Id. at 187.
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the due process clause. Harlan explained:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that those procedures be fundamentally fair in all
respects. It does not, in my view, impose or encourage na-
tionwide uniformity for its own sake; it does not command
adherence to forms that happen to be old; and it does not
impose on the States the rules that may be in force in the
federal courts except where such rules are also found to be
essential to basic fairness.'58
Harlan II particularly attacked the idea (held so strongly
by his grandfather) that the first eight amendments of the Bill
of Rights were incorporated by the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause to apply with equal limitation on the
states. '59 He not only opposed the concept of total incorpora-
tion, but also selective incorporation; in fact, he found more
virtues in the former than in the latter, on the basis that total
incorporation was at least consistent.16 In Duncan, Harlan II
pleaded for determining the disposition of a case on the basis
of whether a fair trial had been conducted. Specifically, he up-
held Justice Cardozo's approach in Palko v. Connecticut'"' of
applying specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states
on the basis of whether fundamental fairness existed in the
case being judged. ' Harlan stated:
There is no obvious reason why a jury trial is a requisite
of fundamental fairness when the charge is robbery, and not
a requisite of fairness when the same defendant, for the
same actions, is charged with assault and petty theft. The
reason for the historic exception for relatively minor crimes
is the obvious one: the burden of jury trial was thought to
outweigh its marginal advantages. . .. [T]he Court has
chosen to impose upon every State one means of trying crim-
inal cases; it is a good means, but it is not the only fair
means, and it is not demonstrably better than the alterna-
tives States might devise.' 3
Is' Id. at 172.
,6' Id. at 174.
,6' Id. at 176.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
391 U.S. at 186-87.
" Id. at 192-93. Justice Black, the consistent advocate of total incorporation,
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In other cases involving incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, Justice Harlan i also dissented. He dissented, for ex-
ample, in Mapp v. Ohio,' 4 in which the exclusionary rule was
made applicable to the states; in the case of Malloy v. Ho-
gan'5 in which states were bound by the fifth amendment's
provision on self-incrimination; and in Miranda v. Arizona,'65
which broadened the scope of the incorporation of the fifth
and sixth amendments. On the other hand, he supported in-
corporation of the right to a speedy trial in Klopfer v. North
Carolina,'7 right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright,'5 and
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in Robinson
v. California. "I It is important to note that he did not support
these rights because of any selective theory of incorporation.
His support of some rights and rejection of others was based
on whether the state procedures satisfied the test of funda-
mental fairness. For example, in his support of the Court's de-
cision in Gideon v. Wainwright,' Harlan II stated his agree-
ment "with the Court that the right to counsel in a case such
concurring in the Court's opinion, presented an attack on Harlan's views that could
have been issued by Harlan's grandfather:
[TIhe "fundamental fairness" test is one on a par with that of shocking the
conscience of the Court. Each of such tests depends entirely on the particu-
lar judge's idea of ethics and morals instead of requiring him to depend on
the boundaries fixed by the written words of the Constitution. Nothing in
the history of the phrase "due process of law" suggests that constitutional
controls are to depend on any particular judge's sense of values. . . .I have
never believed that under the guise of federalism the States should be able
to experiment with the protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of
Rights.
Id. at 168-70.
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
lBS 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
, 385 U.S. 213 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
I would rest decision of this case not on the "speedy trial" provision of the
Sixth Amendment, but on the ground that this unusual North Carolina pro-
cedure, which in effect allows state prosecuting officials to put a person
under the cloud of an unliquidated criminal charge for an indeterminate
period, violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 226.27.
1- 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
'is 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring).
170 372 U.S. 335, 352 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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as this should now be expressly recognized as a fundamental
right embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment. 1' 7' However,
he countered any expansive interpretation of his opinion:
When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal
Government, to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty' and thus valid against the States, I do not read our
past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we automati-
cally carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in
full sweep to the States. . . . In what is done today I do not
understand the Court to depart from the principles laid
down in Palko v. Connecticut. . .or to embrace the concept
that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the Sixth
Amendment as such. 7 2
That the right to counsel was not a right to be afforded in
all state proceedings was borne out in Harlan's dissent in
Douglas v. California,173 which concerned the right of an indi-
gent convicted man to have counsel appointed to handle an
appeal, which service was provided by the state as a matter of
right. The majority held that both the due process clause and
the equal protection clause had been violated by California
when counsel was denied."4 Concerning the due process
clause, Justice Harlan II felt California had not violated any
rights provided therein. Harlan II believed that the California
system of appellate procedure provided adequate review of
any alleged errors in the original trial. According to the proce-
dure in California, the state appellate courts were required to
appoint counsel for an indigent appellant except when "in
their judgment such appointment would be of no value to ei-
ther the defendant or the court."'7 Justice Harlan stated:
This judgment can be reached only after an indepen-
dent investigation of the trial record by the reviewing court.
And even if counsel is denied, a full appeal on the merits is
accorded to the indigent appellant, together with a state-
ment of the reasons why counsel was not assigned. There is
"' Id. at 352.
172 Id.
173 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This was a companion case to
Gideon v. Wainwright.
"I Id. at 358.
,15 People v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958), quoted at 372 U.S. at 364.
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nothing in the present case, or any other case that has been
cited to us, to indicate that the system has resulted in
injustice.'76
Harlan judged that the Gideon case, decided the same
day, was irrelevant because the fourteenth amendment did
not guarantee the right of appellate review. '77 What was im-
portant to Harlan was whether an indigent appellant was
treated fairly: he was satisfied that the appellant under Cali-
fornia procedure "receives the benefit of expert and conscien-
tious legal appraisal of the merits of his case on the basis of
the trial record, and whether or not he is assigned counsel, is
guaranteed full consideration of his appeal." ' He argued that
the right to counsel on appeal was no more to be required in
state courts than in appeals to the United States Supreme
Court: "But as conscientiously committed as this Court is to
the great principle of 'Equal Justice Under Law,' it has never
deemed itself constitutionally required to appoint counsel to
assist in the preparation of each of the more than 1000 pro se
petitions for certiorari currently being filed each Term." '79
In Miranda v. Arizona,""0 Harlan dissented because he felt
the Court had exaggerated police violations of due process and
had placed rules on law enforcement officers that would im-
pede their ability to operate effectively." ' Harlan determined
that the only true test was whether the suspects had confessed
voluntarily. To place upon state and local police the require-
ments of the warnings "is to negate all pressures, to reinforce
the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage
any confession at all." ' This, said Harlan, is "voluntariness
with a vengence." He felt that "[s]ociety has always paid a
stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not
one of the dark moments of the law."'83
,, 372 U.S. at 364.
' Id. at 365.
1,6 Id.
' Id. at 366. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), held that an indigent does not
have right to counsel in a discretionary appeal.
"' 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 517.
' Id.
Id.
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As another example of his devotion to judicial self-re-
straint, Harlan pointed in Miranda to the number of studies
that were being undertaken by various study groups, as well as
some legislatures, to find solutions to the many problems re-
lated to criminal justice institutions and procedures:'"
[TIhe practical effect of the decision made today must inevi-
tably be to handicap seriously sound efforts at reform, not
least by removing options necessary to a just compromise of
competing interests. Of course legislative reform is rarely
speedy or unanimous, though this Court has been more pa-
tient in the past. But the legislative reforms when they come
would have the vast advantage of empirical data and com-
prehensive study, they would allow experimentation and use
of solutions not open to the courts, and they would restore
the initiative in criminal law reform to those forums where it
truly belongs.'85
This is not only a plea for judicial self-restraint but also a plea
for federalism. State legislators should delineate judicial and
criminal justice procedures that reflect their best judgment of
how law and order can most effectively be maintained. Judi-
cially created limitations should be imposed only in response
to obvious violations of fundamental fairness.
An excellent example of Harlan's devotion to federalism
appears in his concurring opinion in In re Gault.'88 Writing for
the 8-1 majority, Justice Fortas held that juvenile justice pro-
ceedings, like adult criminal proceedings, should guarantee
the right to timely and adequate notice,'87 the right to coun-
sel,' " the right of confrontation,'89 the right of cross-examina-
tion ' and recognition of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."8 ' Harlan concurred in this result, but agreed with Fortas
only as regards the right to notice and the right to counsel. He
added that "[T] he court must maintain a written record, or its
' Id. at 522.
'' Id. at 524.
'' 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' Id. at 33-34.
'' Id. at 41.
,' Id. at 56.
, Id. at 57.
191 Id.
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equivalent, adequate to permit effective review on appeal or in
collateral proceedings. 1192 He felt, however, that the remaining
rights enumerated by Justas Fortas ought to be carefully de-
fined so as not to convert juvenile court proceedings into ordi-
nary criminal trials and thus thwart an important purpose of
these specialized courts. 9' "[T]he Court should now impose no
more procedural restrictions than are imperative to assure
fundamental fairness, and that the States should instead be
permitted additional opportunities to develop without unnec-
essary hindrance their systems of juvenile courts." '94
Harlan II also discussed two ancillary considerations.
First, many children are brought to juvenile court who are not
guilty of criminal conduct. As programs are developed for
treating these juveniles, the state acts in loco parentis, con-
cerned more with protection than punishment. The "Four-
teenth Amendment does not demand that [these efforts] be
constricted by the procedural guarantees devised for ordinary
criminal prosecutions." '95 Second, Harlan II reminds us that
juvenile courts are presently under earnest study throughout
the nation:
I very much fear that this Court, by imposing these rigid
procedural requirements, may inadvertently have served to
discourage these efforts to find more satisfactory solutions
for the problems of juvenile crime, and may thus now ham-
per enlightened development of the systems of juvenile
courts. It is appropriate to recall that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not compel the law to remain passive in
the midst of change; to demand otherwise denies 'every
quality of the law but its age."96
,,2 Id. at 72.
"' Id. at 75.
' Id. at 76.
, Id. at 77.
,38 Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added). This phrase, "every quality of the law but its
age," originated with Justice Brewer's majority opinion in Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 529 (1884), a case in which, it will be recalled, Justice Harlan I was the lone
dissenter. Another case in which Justice Harlan 11 dissented because he felt state ju-
dicial proceedings were being limited unduly was Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In
Fay, three men were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
sole evidence against each was a signed confession taken by police who were utilizing
coercive tactics. Noia was afraid to appeal because a new trial might result in his
execution. Was his failure to appeal a deliberate attempt to by-pass available state
1979-80l
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Many cases demonstrate that Harlan I operated on the
assumption that the purpose and effect of the fourteenth
amendment was to require the states to follow fair procedures
in criminal prosecution; the question of fairness should be de-
termined not by the Bill of Rights but on the basis of the par-
ticular case. In Estes v. Texas,'97 which reflected this attitude,
the Court reversed Estes' conviction for swindling because it
determined his due process rights had been violated by the use
of television in the courtroom and feared his case had been
prejudiced by the use of film clips on regular news programs. 13
In a concurring opinion Justice Harlan demonstrated his habit
of weighing both sides carefully to arrive at what appears to be
the favorable side of an almost evenly balanced issue:
Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably has
mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached
atmosphere which should always surround the judicial pro-
cess. Forbidding this innovation, however, would doubtless
impinge upon one of the valued attributes of our federalism
by preventing the States from pursuing a novel course of
procedural experimentation. My conclusion is that there is
no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in
the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial
such as this one, the considerations against allowing televi-
sion in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing fac-
tors advanced in its support as to require a holding that
what was done in this case infringed the fundamental right
to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9
procedures? Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority said:
Under no reasonable view can the State's version of Noia's reason for not
appealing support an inference of deliberate by-passing of the state court
system. For Noia to have appealed in 1942 would have been to run a sub-
stantial risk of electrocution. His was the grisly choice whether to sit con-
tent with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal
which, if successful, might well have led to a retrial and death sen-
tence .... He declined to play Russian Roulette in this fashion. This was a
choice by Noia not to appeal, but under the circumstances it cannot realis-
tically be deemed a merely tactical or strategic litigation step, or in any way
a deliberate circumvention of state procedures.
Id. at 439-40 (footnotes omitted).
197 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
" Id.
"' Id. at 587.
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It is difficult to imagine Justice Harlan I, who seemed
never in doubt about what truth and virtue required, exper-
iencing such agony in arriving at an opinion. Notice that for
Justice Harlan II the problem was not only a matter of balanc-
ing countervailing values, but also a matter of recognizing
that there are possible situations in which the use of television
might not violate due process, especially a trial in which there
has been little publicity. 0 Such was obviously not the case in
the trial of Estes.
2. Justice Harlan II and the Right to Privacy
"It is sometimes surmised, without a careful reading of
the opinions and the rationale involved, that because Justice
Harlan is frequently not on the side of the Court's 'civil liber-
ties' he is an anti-liberal, etc."2 ' An analysis of Harlan's opin-
ions in Poe v. Ullman0 2 and Griswold v. Connecticut 23 reveals
that the principles of "ordered liberty" which Harlan faith-
fully applied were flexible enough to condemn invasions of pri-
vacy as violations of the fourteenth amendment.
Poe v. Ullman involved a challenge to the Connecticut
birth control law under declaratory judgment procedure. Suit
was instituted to obtain birth control information and to allow
doctors the freedom to disseminate such information. By a 5-4
vote the Court, in a decision written by Justice Frankfurter,
dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was no true
controversy since the law had been enforced only once in its
history. Thus, the Court reasoned, there was little if any rea-
son to fear prosecution. 24
Harlan II dissented. He stated, "I cannot agree that their
enjoyment of this privacy is not substantially impinged upon
when they are told that if they use contraceptives .. . the
only thing which stands between them and being forced to
render criminal account of their marital privacy is the whim of
"I Id. at 590.
20' Ledbetter, supra note 107, at 405.
- 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 507-08.
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the prosecutor." ' Harlan also argued that this was a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, not be-
cause the right was nationalized, but because it affected the
deprivation of a fundamental right, namely, the right of mari-
tal privacy. 8
It is interesting to compare Poe v. Ullman to the more
famous decision on this issue, Griswold v. Connecticut,27 de-
cided four years later. In this case the state did prosecute per-
sons for violating the anti-contraceptive statute. In a 7-2 deci-
sion, the Court declared the Connecticut statute
unconstitutional. The majority decision written by Justice
Douglas held that the right of marital privacy was "within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." 0 '
Harlan II concurred in the Griswold decision, but not the
rationale, for the reasons he had articulated in Poe v. Ullman.
He thought that the law violated the due process clause be-
cause it violated the basic values "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" as expressed by Justice Cardozo in Palko.0 9
Harlan concluded: "While the relevant inquiry may be aided
by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in
my opinion, on its own bottom. 2 10
CONCLUSION
Justice Harlan I perceived the Court's rule to be the de-
fender of individual rights. It has been pointed out that
Harlan participated in thirty-nine cases dealing with civil
rights of Blacks in the United States.21 1 "In every case where
the Supreme Court upheld the claimed rights of Negro peti-
tioners, Justice Harlan was with the majority," but dissented
m Id. at 536.
Id. at 539.
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 485.
2" Id. at 500. See note 161 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
Palko.
"I0 Id. at 500.
211 Westin, supra note 2, at 697.
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in "every case where the Court declared federal civil rights
legislation to be unconstitutonal or unconstitutionally ap-
plied. 2 2 Harlan I's opinions were not governed by a strict ju-
dicial philosophy. Thus at times Harlan I was a judicial ac-
tivist in his passion for civil rights, while at other times he was
a proponent of judicial self-restraint. His conception of sub-
stantive justice invariably led him to support the "just" result
in a case; in the civil rights cases dealing with Blacks he of-
fered unfailing support. As one scholar noted, "Harlan stood
in the classic pattern of those who espouse judicial self-re-
straint on behalf of majority rule but are so devoted to civil
liberty that they cannot always restrain themselves. 213
In contrast, Justice Harlan 1" criticized the attempts of
judicial activists to use the Court as a tool of social reform. He
pleaded on several occasions for a Court which limited its role
to interpreting the laws and the Constitution. The role of ef-
fecting social change, he argued, was proper for the political
branches of government and the states, but not for the Court.
Thus, he maintained that there was no doctrine of civil rights
in Constitutional jurisprudence, that reasonable exercises of
the state legislative power were never to be restricted even
though statutes might foster private discrimination based in
racial prejudices, and that principles of federalism militated
against incorporation of the Bill of Rights so long as the states
nurtured policies favoring dictates of fundamental fairness.
His detached position regarding individual rights asserted in a
particular case stands in stark contrast to the passionate sup-
port which his grandfather undeviatingly provided as the lone
dissenter in civil rights cases several decades before.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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